FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS.*
WHAT

THEN

ARE THE OFFENcES WiICi

IMAY

RESULT IN

IMPEACHMENT?

In answering this question it is not possible to prepare a
final list thereof, any more than it would be if it were to include
only statutory crimes, in view of the fact that each session of
Congress, and each session of every state legislature, adds to the
number of crimes. It may be said in this, as in relation to everything else human, "The times change and we change with them."
That which would be entirely justifiable at one time, in one
place and under one set of circumstances, might be unjustifiable
at another time, in another place, and under another set of circumstances. The Constitution itself recognizes this fact when
it says: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except when in case of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it."'

But inter armes silent leges stands not alone. The standard
of conduct required of a public official in a highly civilized
conmmunity may be very different from that required of another
in a place peopled only by miners, cowboys, and the like. A
public officer, especially a judicial one, who, without cause, persists in parading the streets and appearing in his office in grossly
fantastic costume, or who insults or abuses all those who have
public business to transact with him, might well be impeached
for a wilful disregard of those proprieties recognized by the
community in which the business of the office is transacted, and
necessary to be observed in order that the public may be properly
serve&
So, also, the circumstances surrounding the particular individual may vary the standard of conduct. For instance, that
which was permitted of Judge Field during the time he was
tder threat of death by David S. Terry, woud not be permitted
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of another undler no such stress. One has only to read Cunningham v. Neagle,2 to be satisfied of the necessity for that distinction.
But that impossibility does not permit of the conclusiun that
there is no limitation to the offences for which impeachment will
lie. If that were so then the words "treason, bribery or other
high crimes and misdemeanors" would themselves be meaningless words, and that which was intended to be a measure for
preserving the government "pure and undefiled," might become
a means of oppression, and therefore of impurity and defilement
of that very government. As Judge Story well puts it in his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
"The doctrine, indeed, would be truly alarming that the common law did not regulate, interpret, and control the powers and
duties of the court of impeachment. What, otherwise, would become of the rules of evidence, the legal notions of crimes, and the
application of principles of public or municipal jurisprudence to
the charges against the accused? It would be a most extraordinary
anomaly, that while every citizen of every state, originally composing the Union, would be entitled to the common law, as his
birthright, and at once his protector and guide; as a citizen of the
Union, or an officer of the Union, he would be subjected to no
law, to no principles, to no rules of evidence.

.

.

.

If the com-

mon law has no existence, as to the Union, as a rule or guide, the
whole proceedings are completely at the arbitrary pleasure of the
government and its functionaries in all its departments."
In defining the power it is clear that the offence must be
one of a serious character. The use of the word "high" imports that. It is said by Bryce in The American Commonwealth:4
"Impeachment

.

.

.

is the heaviest artillery in the con-

gressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary
use. It is like a hundred ton gun which needs complex machinery
to bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it,
and a large mark to aim at. Or to vary the simile, impeachment
it what the physicians call a heroic medicine, an extreme remedy,
proper to be applied against an official guilty of political crimes,
but ill adapted for the punishment of small transgressions."
2135 U. S. S1(x89o).

'3rd Ed., Sec. 798.
4

ist Ed., p. =&
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A public officer may be criminally convicted of trespass,
though acting under a claim of right, or for excessively speeding
his automobile, yet neither would justify impeachment. If, however, the conviction was followed by imprisonment, impeachment might be well maintained, for the office would be brought
ir.to contempt if a convict were allowed to administer it. It
may be said that, in that event, impeachment would depend on
the severity or lenity of a trial judge, and this would be so,
but -for the office's sake, a man may be said to be guilty of a
"high misdemeanor" if he so acts as to be imprisoned. Surely
the whole matter can well be left to the sound judgment and discretion of the House and Senate, which doubtless would see that
spite and enmity did not result in coiviction on impeachment.
For the same reason, while the misdemeanors for which
impeachment will lie are not necessarily indictable offences, yet
they must be of such a "high" character as might properly be
made criminal.5 That far, at least, the maxim noscitur a sociis
is applicable; for it is inconceivable that disconnected and unassociated matters would, in the same sentence, be made subject
to the same criminal treatment, with possibly the same measure
of punishment in case of conviction. The human mind does not
travel, at one and the same time, along diverging lines, any
more than the human body does; and hence those who framed
and those who adopted the Constitution must alike have construed this clause as dealing with subject matters of the same
generic kind.
Clearly also the offence must be one against the United
States. Article II, Section 2, implies that.
Clearly also the offence must be one in some way affecting
of the office, from which it is sought to exadministration
the
clude the offender. This does not necessarily mean that it must
have been an offence committed while performing the duties of
the office; but it does mean that the character of the offence, or
that which flows therefrom, must tend to bring the office, if the
'Foster on the Constitution, Sec. 93; "Law of Impeachment,"
and Comnent, 454.
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incumbent is continued therein, into ignominy and disgrace. It
will not do to say that a convicted wilful murderer could defend
himself f roi impeachment upon the ground that the murder was
not committed virtute offlcii. Nor, on the other hand, will it do
to say that an alleged offence justifies impeachment simply because the House and Senate is of opinion that the respondent
should have acted differently, if that which he did in no way
affects the administration of the office. It is highly improbable
that "treason" would be committed virtute officii,. and bribery
may not be, yet both are impeachable whether so committed or
not. Hence the maxim noscitur a sociis would seem to exclude
that as a necessity in the cases of high crimes and misdemeanors.
In endeavoring to define this power, so as to give a working
and workable rule, as well as a guide to the "civil officers of the
United States" who may be impeached, as to the Senate, which
may try them if they overstep the bounds, one naturally turns
to the Constitution itself to see if there is anything therein which
will kid in the definition. In viewing the matter from that high
plane it must be admitted that the limits are negatively rather
than positively expressed. For instance, the First Amendment
would be construed to debar an impeachment on religious
grounds, or for freedom of speech or of printing, or for peaceably assembling to petition for redress of grievances; notvithstanding the numerous instances of impeachment therefor in
England. But beyond these, and a few similar matters, the Constitution does not aid the definition.
The assertion so frequently made, that in the case of judges,
Article III, Section i, which says that the judges "both of the
supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good
behavior," furnishes a guide, is necessarily a fallacious one for
three reasons:
(I) It would exclude "good behavior" as a test in the case
of those officers, like the President and Vice-President, specifically named in the impeachment clause, because they hold for
a term and not simply "during good behavior." The words
"other high crimes and misdemeanors" being applied in that
clause to both classes of officers alike, must be defined alike in
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its application to both. If we assume that the standard of conduct would vary with the different offices, yet that would result
by reason of the character of the offices, and not by reason of
the fact that one class held "during good behavior," even though
it be said that the difference in the term of office is a constitutional recognition of a difference in the classes. Would any
one pretend that if, by constitutional amendment, the judges
would hold their offices for a term of years, that the character
of offences for which they could be impeached would thereby
be changed? Yet so it must be if the effect claimed must be
given to the words "during good behavior." It is not meant to
assert thereby that a lack of "good behavior" is not to be considered, whether in the case of a judicial or any other civil officer; but it is meant to say that the term of the judge being
"during good behavior" only, is not the determinative factor in
considering what, as to him, constitutes an impeachable offence.
(2) It is only by reasoning in a circle, which always ends
nowhere, that even a specious character can be given to- the
argument. Judges, like other civil officers, can only be impeached for "treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors." Their tenure of office is "during good behavior."
To say then, that "treason, bribery or other high crimes and
misdemeanors" is defined, quoad judges only, by "good behavior," is only to say that a judge is entitled to retain his office
because of "good behavior," so long as he has not been impeached
and convicted of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," for only by impeachment can he be removed; and
we are exactly where we started.
(3) The argument is historically inaccurate. Prior to 1700,
judges, like all other officials, were removable at the pleasure of
the king. By a statute passed in that year (13 William III, C. 2)
it is provided:
"Judges' commissions shall be made quaindiu se bene gesserint,
and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address
of *both houses of parliament it may be lawful to remove them."
Under that statute a judge was safe from removal by the king
alone, but his "good behavior" did not save his commission from
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lapsing upon the death of the king; and it was not until the
passage of the statute of i George III, c. 23 (176o), that the
judges remained in office, despite the king's death. This statute
provided:
"The commissions of judges for the time being shall be, continue and remain, in full force, during their good behavior, notwithstanding the demise of his Majesty (whom God long preserve)
or any of his heirs and successors; any law, usage or practice to the
contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding."
The wliole argument on this question may be stated syllogistically. Either the word "misdemeanor" does or does not include
misbehavior. If it does, it needs not the aid of the "good behavior" provision. If it does not, then as impeachment only
lies for "misdemeanors," it is of no value.
Nor is the question as to the grounds for an impeachment
one entirely at large, as has sometimes been argued because of
the use of the word "sole" in Article I, Section 2, which provides that the House of Representatives "shall have the sole
power of impeachment," and in Article I, Section 3, which
provides that the Senate "shall have the sole power to try all
impeachments." Those words simply emphasize the fact that, as
to officers of the United States, those powers are exclusively in
the House and Senate. Opponents of the Constitution, when
it was before the various states for ratification, argued that they
might be held to exclude the right of impeachment in the states,
as against state officers, for offences against the states. The
friends of the Constitution as strenuously denied this, and argued, from the character of the government itself, as a federated government-the amendments not having then been adopted
-that only those powers vested in it which were granted expressly or by necessary implication, and hence, as the Constitution was intended to secure the United States as such, the language used could not be held to refer to the states or state officers.
The answer was: But here it is expressly granted in the most
exclusive terms. The arguments thus made formed part of the
reasons for the immediate adoption of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
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The argument, upon which the claim is made that the
matter is in the sole discretion of the House and Senate, is
substantially as follows. Article II, Section 4, says:
"The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the
United States, shall-be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors."
This is only a designation of the minimum punishment which
shall be imposed in case of a conviction, in impeachment proceedings, of the particular officers named for the particular offences named, and is not a designation either of who may be
impeached, or the offences for which they may be impeached;
and, hence, as the House has the sole power to impeach and
the Senate the sole power to try the impeachment, necessarily
those matters are in the "sole" discretion of those two bodies.
If this is so, then as the Constitution contains no other provision on the subject, every citizen is liable to impeachment, just.
as in England. In that event trial by jury may be rightfully
abrogated, at the option of the House and Senate, in all cases
of crimes, charged against either a citizen or an official, and the
citizen is powerless, for the Constitution provides no means for
a review of a conviction by the Senate; and the non-office holding citizen may be impeached for any imaginary offence, and
debarred, upon conviction, of ever thereafter holding office
under the United States. Were this so, it would be easy for the
House and Senate to prevent the inaugurationof an antagonistic
President-elect. Happily, however, all the authorities, both in
and out of the Senate, disagree with that view, and it was admitted to be incorrect by the Managers of the House in the
Belknap Impeachment, and also in the Swayne Impeachment.s
In Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States, it is said: T
"From this clause it appears that the remedy by impeachment
is strictly confined to civil officers of the United States, including
the President and Vice President. In this respect it differs mate03 Hinds' Precedents, Secs.
' 3rd

Ed., Sec. 79o.
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rially from the law and practice of Great Britain. In that kingdom
all the king's subjects, whether peers or commoners, are impeachable in parliament, though it is *asserted that commoners cannot
now be impeached for capital offences, but for misdemeanors only.
Such kinds of misdeeds, however, as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust, are the most -proper,
and have been the most usual ground for this kind of prosecution
in parliament. There seems a peculiar propriety, in a republican
government at least, in confining the impeaching power to persons
holding office. In such a government all the citizens are equal
and ought to have the same security of a trial by jury for all
crimes and offences laid to their charge, when not holding any official character. To subject them to impeachment would not only
be extremely oppressive and expensive, but would endanger their
lives and liberties, by exposing them against their wills to persecution for their conduct in exercising their political rights and privileges." •
The same conclusion must necessarily be reached when the
Constitution is considered in the light of the Tenth Amendment, which says:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alteriws applied to
Article II, Section 4, necessarily excludes the claim that citizens
can be impeached, for impeachment is therein limited to civil
officers. Moreover, as only office-holders can be removed from
office, it necessarily follows that the provision applies to them
only. If this is not so, then the decision in the Blount Impeachment is incorrect, whether it be treated as decided that a
Senator is not within the category of "civil officers of the
United States," or as deciding that one not in office when the
proceedings began is not amenable to the action; for Howell's
State Trials are full of impeachments of members of the House
of Lords. So, too, the reasoning and conclusion in the Belknap
*The same thing is said in Rawle on the Constitution (2nd Ed.) p.213;
Pomeroy's Constitutional Law (9th Ed.) Sec. 716; Tucker on the Consti-

tution of the United States (1899) P. 414; Black's Hand Book of America
Constitutional Law (3rd .Ed.) p. 137; Foster on the Constitution, Vol. x,
pp 566-570; Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives (t9R7)

Vol. 3,Sec. 2315. These authorities quote the Senatorial decisions on this
question, and preclude the necessity of repeating them here.
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Impeachment is wrong, whether the majority or the minority
were correct on the question of his liability to impeachment, because of his successful "race with the law" in getting the President to accept his resignation a few hours before the House of
Representatives voted to impeach him. These considerations
justify Madison's criticism of that claim as made in the Blount
case as "the most extravagant novelty that has been broached."'
Many attempts have been made to define this power, quite
commonly by those who were trying to make the definition fit the
facts of a particular case, rather than to have it accord with
the constitutional provisions only.10 A notable exception to this,
however, though part Of the argument upon which his conclu-sion is founded, has hereinbefore been shown to be fallacious,
is what was said by Manager (afterwards President) Buchanan
in the Peck Impeachment:"
"What is misbehavior in office? In answer to this question
and without pretending to furnish a definition, I freely admit that
we are bound to prove that the respondent has violated the Constitution, or some known law of the land. This, I think, is the
principle fairly to be deduced from all the arguments on the trial
of Judge Chase, and from the votes of the Senate on the Articles
of Impeachment against him, in opposition to the principle for
which his counsel in the first instance strenuously contended, that
in order to render an offence impeachable it must be indictabfe.
But this violation of law may consist in the abuse, as well as in the
usurpation of authority. The abuse of a power which has been
given may be as criminal as the usurpation of a power that has not
been granted."
Perhaps that statement, should be broadened to include offences of so weighty a character, and so injurious to the office,
that every official is bound to know that they are of the same
general character as crimes, and might well be made criminal
by statute; but the terra incognita beyond, no one can properly
be asked to explore under the existing constitutional provisions,
if for no other reason than because it is a fixed and salutary
*2 American Political and Social Science Review, 386.
"Suppl. to Cong. Globe. 2nd Sess. 40th Congress, pp. 5o. 254; 3 Hinds'
Precedents, Secs. 2357, 2379: Story on the Constitution (3rd Ed.) Sec. 764;
i Foster on the Constitution Sgi-59&
u3 Hinds' Precedents, Sec. 2381.
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principle that penal provisions shall be so construed that the
persons to be affected by thenij may certainly know what things
they are forbidden to do. That rule, which Chief Justice Marshall said, "is perhaps not much less old than construction itself,"'1 2 is of enduring importance, for it ever must be, in the
language of Coke, that "the known certaintie of the law is the
safetie of all," and if it be true that in this matter there is no
definiteness, then it is the only matter in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence in which a man may be punished for an offence the
nature of which it was not intended that he should know.It is said that the learned Chairman of the Managers for
the House of Representatives in the Archbald Impeachment, said
that in convicting the respondent, the Senate had adopted "a
code of judicial ethics for the first time in American history.""3
If by that was meant that "for the first time in American history" a judge was successfully impeached for doing that which
was governed by no law except the universal law of good conduct, which every judge is supposed to know and give heed to, no
objection can be taken thereto. But if it was meant to say that
it was thereby determined that a judge can be impeached for a
mere breach of "a code of judicial ethics," then may we recall
that "it was long ago remarked by DeTocqueville that a decline
of public morals in the United States would probably be marked
by the abuse of the power of impeachment as a means of crushing political adversaries or ejecting them from office."'1 4 For
that unwritten "code" varies with the times and with the place,
and almost with the individual citizen.
Ex-President Taft, in an address before the American Bar
Association in 1913, stated that the result of that trial was a
"liberal interpretation of the term 'high misdemeanor.'" He
said:
"Most useful in demonstrating to all incumbents of the federal bench that they must be careful in their conduct outside of
court as well as in the court itself, and that they must not use the
1U. S. v. Wiltberger, $ Wheaton 76 (i82o).

" Harper's Weekly, Feb. iS, z913,
"i Hare: Amer. Const. L*w 211.

p. 9.
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prestige of their official position, directly or indirectly, to secure
I
personal benefit."
The objection to that statement is that so long as humanity
remains as it is, "the prestige of their official position" will
nearly always enure "directly or indirectly, to secure personal
benefit" to a judge, if he transacts any outside business, or even
makes investments or purchases. Moreover, as the Managers
of the House in that case repeatedly stated that they did not
challenge the Judge's ability, integrity, or impartiality," perhaps a better way of expressing the result of the trial would
be to say that it determined that a judge ought not only to be
impartial, but he ought so to demean hitnself, both in and out
of court, that litigants will have no reason to suspect his impartiality; and that repeatedly failing in that respect constitutes
a "high misdemeanor" in regard to his office. If such be considered the result of that case, every one must agree that it established a much needed precedent.
Now comes the next great question.
CAN AN OFFICER-BE IMPEACHED FOR OFFENCES COMMITTED
BEFORE

His

INDUCTION INTO OFFICE?

Those who pin their faith to the argument that the "good
behavior" clause in the case of judges, determines the grounds
for their impeachment, must logically limit impeachments to a
date after that of the official's commission; for by that argument the whole matter is one of implied contract, the officer
agreeing by the acceptance of a "good behavior" contract that
when he ceases to exercise "good behavior" he may be ousted

by impeachment.
The matter is beset with difficulties however it is viewed, but
it would seem clear that if the offence is directly connected with
the attainment of the office he occupies when impeached, as a
violation of the Corrupt Practices Act in relation to his nomination or election, as was alleged in the Sulzer case, the impeach"36th Annual Report Am. Bar Assn. 431.
"Archbald Impeachment, 888, 889, 892, 9o6, 9iS.
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ment ought to prevail. So, too, if the offence was the subject
of consideration, and the facts in regard to it were substantially known at the time of his election, or appointment and confirmation, it should not again be brought forward. It is within
the memory of all of us that a candidate for president was
charged with and admitted during the campaign the commission
by him of a grave moral offence in his early life, yet, because
during the years thereafter, he lived a life "void of offence
towards God and towards man," he was wisely elected by the
people, and became one of the best of our presidents.
In the Archbald impeachment the question was directly
raised, the respondent being charged with offences alleged to
have been committed while a District Judge, though at the
time of his impeachment he was a Circuit Judge assigned to
sit in the Commerce Court. He was acquitted on all such
charges, but some of the votes for acquittal were because the
offences were not deemed serious enough; some because the Senators were not certain and did not feel it necessary to become
certain as to the proper decision of the legal question now being
considered, in view of the respondent's conviction on other articles; and some because the Senators did not think he could properly be tried upon such charges. A number of Senators were
excused from voting on those articles. The matter cannot be
said, therefore, to have been decided in that case. Its importance, and the possibilities rising out of it, was clearly pointed
out by Judge Archbald's counsel in their brief, when in speaking of ex-President Taft, and of his manifold public activities,
they said:'
"The President of the United States at one time held the office
of Solicitor General; at another time he was 4 Circuit Judge of the
United States; at another time he was Governor of the Philippine
Islands; at another time he was Secretary of War. Is it possible
that he can now be the subject of impeachment for any act committed by him at the time he held any- one of those offices? If so,
he may be removed from his prosent office as President of the
United States by a majority of the House and two-thirds of the
Senate for alleged offences charged to have been committed while
he held any one of the other positions above mentiond."
'Archbald Impeachmeat xio4.
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And the further importance and possibilities thereof will appear
from the statement that a House and Senate could, if there were
an antagonistic two-thirds, prevent a president-elect from assuming office, if he were or ever had been a federal official.
In the state impeachments the decisions seem all to be the
one way. Judge Barnard was convicted in New York of offences
committed during a prior term, after a learned argument citing
many precedents. 2 So was Judge Hubbell in Wisconsin.8 And
a number of other instances were given by the Managers in the
Archbald case.
Where then should the line be drawn? The Constitution
does not draw it, unless it is drawn at the point that the offence
must have been committed during the then existing term of
office, though it does not directly say so. As in all such matters much must be left to the sound judgment and discretion
of the representatives of the people, who presumably will. do
what is right, moved thereto partially, as both branches of Congress now are, by their direct responsibility to the people. It
would be strange indeed, in this day when all men are moving
to a higher goal, and when facts are spread nation-wide in a
fraction of a day, if the people were to abandon all ideas of
right and justice,.'fo" prejudice or partisanship or both, and if
they do not two-thirds of-their representatives never will. Responsibility must always be lodged somewhere, and federal responsibility must be lodged in federal officials. In the past but
few, if any, errors have been made in impeachment- proceedings of which the respondents could justly complain, and it
becomes less likely every decade that such errors will be made
in the future. In all human probability the line never will be
drawn at any other point than one where the offence is connected with the office; or is near in point of time to the accentance of the office, and it is found that the incumbent has shown
no "fruits meet for repentence;" that the public good-the
vital thing-requires the impeachment. If that be so, how'Impeachment of Geo. G Barnard, 147-191.
£

x6 Law Reporter 6ox-6=
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ever much the accused and his partisans and friends may complain, the citizenship may look on with undisturbed serenity. 4
This leads us to the last great question.
CAN ONE BE IMPEACHED AFTER

HE HAS CEASED TO BE A

"CIVIL OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES"?.

Judge Story was of opinion that this question should be
answered in the negative, 1 but the question is by no means so
clear as-he seems to think. In Blount's Impeachment the question was raised but not decided, he having been expelled by the
Senate before impeachment, and the case being decided upon the
ground that a Senator is not "a civil officer of the United
States" within the impeachment clause, for the/reason that by
Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution "each house shall be
the judge of the election, return and qualification of its own
members."
In Belknap's Impeachment the question was raised and perhaps decided, but so decided as not to be of value in future
cases, for a majority of the Senate, but less than two-thirds
therecif, held that his resignation and the acceptance thereof,
after the testimony on the question of his impeachment had
all been taken by a committee of the House of Representatives,
and but a few hours before the articles of impeachment were
actually adopted by the House, was inefficacious. Mfore than
one-third of the Senate held, however, that he could not be
impeached even under such circumstances, and hence he was
acquitted. Whether even a majority would have held him.
liable had he been out of office before the House began its inquiry, cannot be known. It should be clear, however, that a
"race with the law," such as he made, ought not to. be successful; and as a practical question it ought to be equally clear
that if he is out of office before an investigation into his conduct is asked, and does not afterwards take office, that the pro'For a very full article, claiming that impeachment will only lie, for
offences committed while in office, see 23 Yale Law Journal, 687.
1 Story on the Constitution (rd Ed.) See. .
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ceedings should not be begun. In the cases of Lord Somers, the
Earl of Macclesfield, Warren Hastings, Lord Melville, and perhaps in other English Impeachments, the respondents were out
of office before the impeachments were begun, but there there are
no constitutional provisions on the subject.
The constitutional provisions which are alleged to govern
the matter with us are Article I, Section 3, and Article II, Section
4. The first provides:
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the Uqited
States.
And the latter states:
" .
The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of
the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors."
The argument seems to be:
(a) Inasmuch as removal from office is required in case
of conviction, and as one not holding office cannot be removed
from office, therefore one not holding office cannot be impeached.
(b) Those who can be impeached are "the President, VicePresident and all civil officers," and one not holding office cannot
be placed in either class.
That argument, however, is illusory under both heads. Article I, Section 3, is simply a limitation upon the penalty. It is
not a designation of the time when an impeachment must be
begun. It might just as well be said that because a statute says
that punishment of a public official who violates the Corrupt
Practices Act shall not extend further than removal from office
and fine and imprisonment, that one who resigns his office
cannot be tried at all. So also Article II, Section 4, simply says
that the officials named "shall be removed" on conviction. It
does not say that if they are convicted they may not be otherwise punished, or that by their act of resigning they may escape
all punishment. It might just as well be said that as Article II,
Section 4, says that they shall be removed upon conviction, that
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that meant, as to the officers named, that they could not be disqualified as to future office holding, notwithstanding the provisions of Article I, Section 3. The two constitutional provisions taken together simply mean that, if still holding office,
they must be removed upon conviction, and that the limit of
punishment beyond that is disqualification for the future. That
is the reasonable meaning of the words, and, as already pointed
out, that is the rule of construction for the Constitution.
The question is perilously near being simply a moot one.
With Congress having more -to do than time within which
properly to do it, it is ,not likely that an ex-official will ever be
impeached, unless he later accepts a federal office; and it is not
likely that he will accept, or having accepted will retain such
office, if he knows that he will be impeached. Those who are
so much interested in the question as not to be satisfied with
the brief statement here made, will find that all that can profitably be said on either side thereof, was said by the Managers
and counsel for respondents in Blount's and Belknap's cases.
It is thought that the questions so far considered are the
most important that arise in connection with the subject of this
disiussion. Several others naturally suggest themselves, however, which might well be considered at this time.
WHAT

RULE

RELATING TO EVIDENCE AND THE COMPETENCY

OF WITNESSES ARE APPLICABLE IN IMPEACHMENT TRIALS?

Shall the rules of evidence be such as were in force when
the Constitution was adopted; or those in force in the District
of Columbia, where impeachment is tried; or those in force
where the acts complained of occurred? And what shall be
done in that regard where the acts complained of occurred in
more than one jurisdiction? In view of the fact that the state
rules in which a federal district is, are applied in the federal
courts, those questions would seem to be quite difficult; and
they might be most important, for in some jurisdictions the
impeached person and his wife would be excluded from testify-
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ing, as would also any person who might succeed the accused
in office if he were removed therefrom, as for instance, the VicePresident, on an impeachment of the President. In practice,
however, they are not, for the Senate has invariably received
all the evidence which it deemed relevant, from any witness who
had personal knowledge of the facts, no matter by whom it was
to be proved, and left its weight to be determined upon final
consideration.
EFFECT OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION.

At one time it was very strongly urged that under the Sixth
Amendment an impeached person was entitled to a -jury trial.
That view was urged by Senator Tazewell in the Blount case,
though he did not vote on the question of dismissing the impeachment, and by correspondence and in his speeches. The
Amendment provides as follows:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused'shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
.Senator Tazewell's contention, however, never was taken seriously, for the reason that contemporary history shows that the
fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments were well known to have
been passed to meet complaints, made with great force while the
Constitution was under consideration by the various states, that
it nowhere provided for jury trials in the ordinary civil and
criminal suits, and that, therefore, the people would be worse
off in that regard than they were before they threw off the
yoke of. Great Britain. Those complaints never dealt with impeachments any more than they did with martial law, and hence
the amendments were construed to effectuate the purpose intended by them, and were not extended to proceedings never
intended to be reached thereby. In one sense impeachment is a
"criminal prosecution," but those words as used in the Sixth
Amendment evidently refer to ordinary crimes, as does the Fifth
Amendment.
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ATTENDANCE OF SENATORS AT THE TRIAL.

Turning from the legal to the practical side of an impeachment trial, the thing that strikes a common law lawyer
most is the few Senators who in fact listen to the evidence.
During the Archbald Impeachment the membership of the Senate exceeded ninety, yet rarely over twenty members were present. Perhaps a hundred times the members present -were privately counted with the result stated. At times some Senator
would suggest the absence of a quorum, when the bells would
sound throughout the Senate wing of the Capitol, the Senators
would troop in and remain long enough to answer to their names,
the presiding officer would gravely announce: "On a call of
the roll of the Senate fifty-four Senators have responded to their
names. A quorum of the Senate is present," and the trial would
proceed, though the merest glance around the chamber would
show that a quorum of the Senate was not present when the announcement was made. Perhaps the usual twenty or so were
at that time increased to thirty or thirty-five, the additional
number remaining for a few moments, and then returning from
whence they came, leaving the Senate as bare as it had been
before. While that result was, and in all such cases must be
regretted, yet it is not so much to be wondered at. Most of the
work of Congress must now be done by committees, and the
Senator who really attends to that work, and is present at the
important legislative sessions of the Senate, has all his official
time fully occupied. An impeachment trial encroaches very
much on that time, and for that reason probably is partly
neglected.
Yet certain Senators were always present, and always courteous and considerate, however great the strain upon them and
however limited the time at their disposal. It-would be discriminatory to name those whom the writer can now recall; but without subjecting himself to that charge, he can say that the presiding officer, Senator Bacon of Georgia, was always present,
and that it is a pleasure now to recall, as it was a pleasure then
to feel, that he courteously, conscientiously, and fairly ruled
every question he was called upon to decide;
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SUGGESTIONS

AS TO IETIHODS OF OBTAINING

EVIDENCE.

Whqether or not the present method of impeachment is continued, it is evident that radical changes ought to be made in
the matter of the production of the evidence. With Congress
now sitting a large part of the entire year, and with the rapidly
growing legislative business of the country, due time cannot be

given by the whole Senate to the hearing of the witnesses. In
the Archbald Impeachment portions of seven days were taken in
preliminary arrangements in the Senate, the trial consumed from
December 3rd to December 19th, 1912, inclusive, and from January 3rd to January 8th, 1913, inclusive, and the decision was

rendered January 13th, 1913. The Senators could not afford
that time and properly attend to their other duties, and the result was, as heretofore stated, but few of the Senators really
heard the whole case.
Inasmuch as the method for obtaining the evidence and of
hearing the case, is in the exclusive control of the Senate, it is
evident that much of the difficulty may be remedied by appropriate rules of procedure. The rules in force at present were
adopted many years ago, the latest revision being at the time
of the impeachment of President Johnson. So great was the
necessity felt for amendment immediately succeeding the Arch-

bald Impeachment, that constitutional amendments were proposed to remedy some of the difficulties again made plain in
that trial, as they had been made plain in all the later impeachments. A constitutional amendment, however, is practically impossible of attainment.
But much can be done by a change of the rules. It has not
been unknown in the past to have the testimony taken before
other than the trying body. In Jefferson's Manual, in referring
to impeachments before the House of Lords, it is said :'
"The practice is to swear the witnesses in open House, and then
examine them there; or a committee may be named who shall examine them in committee, either on interrogatories agreed on in
the House or such as the committee jn their discretion shall deniand."
An examination of the proceedings in Parliament not only bears
' Seld.

Jur. i2o, z23.
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out the foregoing statement, but shows also that the Lords at
times decided the case upon the testimony taken for the Commons, or upon that testimony added to by other testimony taken
by the Lords.
If the plan of having a committee of the Senate take the
testimony were adopted, much time would be saved, except as
to the Senators who were members of the committee. But it
would not alone give all the relief desired, nor, in the opinion
of the writer, is it the best plan within the narrow limits intended to be covered by it. An Act of Congress could be passed
which would provide that the testimony should be taken beforeUnited States judges within a reasonable distance of the places
where the witnesses were, under such regulations as Congress
should prescribe, representatives of the House of Representatives, and counsel for the accused, to examine and cross-examine
as in other trials, and such testimony to be available both in the
preliminary hearing before the House and in the trial before
the Senate. Thereby the United States would be saved great
expense, the witnesses great inconvenience, the accused great
loss, and the Senators much time. In the Swayne Impeachment
most of the witnesses were brought from Florida to Washington, and in the Archbald Impeachment they were brought from
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. A positive benefit growing out of the course of procedure suggested would be that the
rulings on the question of evidence would be more accurate
than they now are, for they would be decided by judges accustomed to consider such matters, a point wherein the Law Lords
who ruled thereupon in English impeachments had a very decided advantage over our Senators. It is true that there would be
a loss in that the Senators would not see the witnesses, as they
now may, but generally speaking do not, just as they would not
if the evidence were taken by a committee of the Senate; but
salus populi supreina lex.
SUGGESTIONS AS TO CHANGES IN PROCEDURF.

But even that change would not be adequate, nor by any
means all that could be obtained by an amendment of the rules.
In the Archbald Impeachment the evidence did not in any
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degree controvert the answer of the defendant. In the view
which the Senate took of the matter, it could just as well have
been heard and decided upon the Articles of Impeachment and
the answer thereto. Yet days were spent in proving only admitted facts. It may be said that if an impeachment is in its
nature criminal, and the rule that there can be no crime where
there was no intent to do wrong, is to be applied, that the Senate
cannot determine whether or not the intent exists if it is averred
in the Articles and denied in the answer, unless evidence is
taken from which the intent can be found or negatived. It is
a little difficult to see how intent can be extracted from documentary proof, as usually it is, any more than from written
answers, unless the weight of the evidence contradicts the one
or the other. On the other hand, if the defendant is conclusively presumed to intend the natural consequences of his own
acts, evidence will not be required in many cases; and in those
instances where the articles and answer leave that matter in doubt
evidence can be ordered. In those where no such doubt exists,
and they are the more numerous instances, it is a waste of time
to take evidence. Moreover, many of the facts now deemed
necessary to be proved have no bearing upon the question of
intent, as for instance, the status of the respondent, the result of
the alleged wrongdoing, etc., yet, under the present practice, they
must all be proved-a clear waste of time.
So, too, many of the articles could be decided without taking any evidence, and they may be, and in some cases have been
sufficient to impeach and remove from office, yet, under the
present practice, the evidence must be heard as to all the articles
before a vote can be taken on any. Whatever else may be said
as to the impeachment of President Johnson, it was wise to
adjourn the Court of Impeachment sine die as soon as it was
demonstrated, by a vote on certain of the articles, that he could
not be successfully impeached upon any. A court might just
as well try a man for numerous murders, before executing him
for admitted or proven guilt as to one, as to follow the present
senatorial practice upon impeachments. Indeed, the Senate might
very well, upon a consideration of the articles and answer, hear

824

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLI'ANIA L4W REVIEW

and decide one charge alone before taking up any other, when
that charge, if proven, would be sufficient to justify both removal and disqualification for the future. In many instances
that would be fairer to the accused, who may be condemned on
one article because of evidence not fairly applicable thereto, and
not admitted because thereof. And it would leave him something to live on after his trial, instead of pushing him to the
edge of bankruptcy as now.
Enough has been said upon this point to satisfy the most
skeptical that modern methods call for a radical amendment of
the procedure in cases of impeachment. The length to which
this article has gone suggests, however, that it would be wiser,
instead of going into greater details, to give elsewhere the suggested new rules.
Is IMPEACHMENT AN ADEQUATE REMEDY?

This is the really great and important question in all this
controversy. As a practical matter, while there are many thousands of federal officers subject -thereto, the cumbrous nature of
the remedy limits it to the great officers of state. The decision in
the Blount case resulted, and wisely so, in holding that Congressmen are not subject thereto. The power of the President
to remove, and the great improbability that he will retain in
office those wholly unfitted to perform the duties thereof, has
resulted, with one exception, in the exclusion of his official family
from actual impeachment. Notwithstanding that fact, it would
be exceedingly unwise to relieve them from subjection thereto,
for it is quite within the realm of possibility that the day may
come when even a President will care less for the nation's good,
than he does for the fulfillment of his then present desires.
Happily none such has yet appeared.
Judging by the past, however, impeachment as a practical
remedy applies only to the judges. Of the previous impeachments one was of a President, one was of a Senator, one was
of a Secretary of War, and the other six were of judges. Inasmuch as the Senate held in the Belknap case, and also, though
not so clearly, in the Archald case, that impeachments were in-
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tended to reach only those then actually in office at the time of
impeachment, it is reasonably certain that in future impeachments the cases of judges will be relatively more numerous than
as above, for all other offices have but a brief tenure.
It is also reasonably certain, though most of the federal
judges have been very satisfactory officials, that the public good
would have been better conserved if a much greater number
thereof had made way for others better qualified by learning, or
more fitted by temperament, to fill the office. The cumbersome,
expensive, and uncertain nature of the remedy by impeachment;
the dislike to put so serious a stigma upon a judge; the reasonable certainty that other influences than either the public good
or the law of the land would operate to affect the decision; the
uncertainty of the offences which are impeachable offences; all
operate to prevent calling the judge to account in this way.
While it is important, never more so than now, that the
tenure of the judges should be stable, it is only so important
quoad the public because the public good requires it. The good
to the individual judge, while quite important to him personally, becomes so to the public only because of and only so far
as it is bound up in the public good. The moment that stable
tenure is given more weight than the public good requires, that
moment it becomes a public injury. Every lawyer and many
laymen can recall instances of judges who by reason of lack
of learning or because of unjudicial temperament, for the public's
sake, should have been removed from office, but who had not
been guilty of "treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors," no matter how liberally you construe the "good
behavior" clause of their commissions. Out of this fact has
grown the clamor for the recall of judges, against which thinking lawyers ever have and ever should show an unyielding front.
The objection of incompetency and unbecoming conduct unhappily found to exist in a few of the judges, is the substance
of the complaint against the judiciary, and like everything else
substantial it casts a shadow when the sun shines athwart it.
Let us be careful, now that the sun of public opinion is shining
athwart the judiciary, that in a vain endeavor to save the
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shadow we do not endanger the substance. An independent
judiciary is indispensable; but that furnishes no reason for preserving incompetent judges, whether they be mentally, morally,
or constitutionally unfit.
It is evident, however, that it woud be unwise to submit
judges to impeachment and removal upon such uncertain charges
as would have to be made to cover the grounds above referred
to, because the very uncertainty of the definition of the offences
covered by the power of removal would be an invitation to view
the matter from-the political rather than the public standpoint.
This thought points out one of the reasons strongly urged
against the power of impeachment as it now exists, a reason that
sometimes, but happily rarely, has found exemplification in the
trials heretofore held.
It is not to be lost sight of that the judicial department was
intended to be not only a co-ordinate but also an independent
branch of the government, as far removed as possible from the
control of the other branches; and that impeachment of judicial
officers by Congress was only permitted because no other or
better way of protecting the public from the derelictions of their
judges had been devised. That method, however, at once pitchforks the accused judge into the political arena, and invites him
to seek favors from members of the House and Senate, when he
should, so far as possible, be removed from even the temptation
to ask favors from any one, and particularly from political public
officials. And it invites him also to seek the iffluence of the
President and other high officials of the executive department
upon Senators and Representatives, to avoid or restrain contemplated action against him. This not only operates to defeat the intention of keeping the great departments separate and
distinct from each other, but it also tends to destroy the fearlessness and independence of the individual judge.
It is evident, therefore, that any plan for the removal of
incompetent judges which reduces to a minimum the influence of
the legislative and executive departments of the government upon
the judiciary, will be a benefit to the public, if it adequately
protects the public from the continuance in office of those who
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are unfitted therefor.

Can such a plan be devised?

And if so,

will it require a constitutional amendment to make it effective?
It is evident that if there is vested in some judicial tribunal
an effective supervision over the other federal judges, resulting in
the removal of the latter in case they do not propcrly fulfill their
duties, not only will there be a greater freedom in the judges, but
there will also be a judicial determination of the questions at
issue, and a greater benefit to the public because more unfit persons can be removed than by the present system. The trial of
a District Judge by the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals,
preferably of another circuit, and of all other judges by the
Supreme Court itself, would furnish judicial tribunals to try all
but Supreme Court judges. It might be provided that the latter
should be tried by judges of the inferior courts, but this would
infringe upon the dignity of the Supreme Court, and would also
subject the trying judges to a stress because they were sitting
in judgment upon one who theretofore had and who thereafter
might sit in judgment upon them and their rulings. It would
seem better, therefore, that the remedy by impeachment should
remain as it is for the Supreme Court judges, a remedy which
will probably never again be applied to a member of that court.
The plan suggested, however, would reach nearly all the judges.
Can it be obtained without a constitutional amendment?
The tenure of the judges is "during good behavior." Nowhere is
it stated what constitutes "good behavior," unless the impeachment clause is to be read not only as defining those words, but
as supplying also an exclusive remedy in case of an alleged breach
of duty. Article II, Section 3, of the Constitution simply says:
"The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the
United States shall be removed from office, on impeachment for and
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."
But there
removal.
"The
hold their

is no provision that that shall be the only method of
Article III, Section i, says, inter alia:
judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall
.
offices during good behavior."

But it is nowhere said how that "good behavior" is to be ascer-
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tained, and the tenure determined if it does not exist. Article I,
Section 8, says, inter alia:
"'The congress shall have power

.

.

.

to make all laws

which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by. this constitution
in the government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof."
It would seem that under the latter clause Congress would
have power to define what constitutes "good behavior," and to
provide a method for ascertaining whether or not the judges are
complying with the tenure under which they hold, and to cause
them to forfeit their offices if they are not, subject, of course,
to a review by the courts of the question as to whether or not
the definition wholly or partially is within the meaning of those
words as used in the Constitution. By this method the
question becomes a judicial one, as it should be, and the accused
judge will be safeguarded in his right to hold his office exactly
as he is safeguarded in all the other rights vested in him by the
Constitution. That Congress has the power claimed was expressly asserted by Senator Catron in the Archbald Impeachment.1
It may be said that the course suggested would result in
removing the judges still farther from contact with the people.
But this can hardly be so. They do not come into contact with
the people when they are impeached, and experience has shown
that the judiciary is less subject to improper influences than any
other branch of the government, whether by brother judges or
otherwise. It follows that both the public and the accused would
be better protected by the suggested than by the existing remedy.
There is no reason to suppose that the Supreme Court judges
would deal too leniently with derelict judges of the inferior
courts. On the contrary, that just pride which they have ever
had in maintaining the high standing of the judicial department
would operate to counteract any of the influences of association,
even if such there were. Moreover, there would be grounds for
12 Proceedings, etc., on the Trial and Impeachment of Robert W. Arch-

bald,

6x.
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removal not now existing, and derelict judges have greater
spheres of influence with political officers than they have with
judicial.
It is not the writer's purpose to state all the things which
would constitute bad behavior, nor is it intended heroby to specifv the best method for ascertaining the fact of b ad behavior, or
of carrying into effect the judgment if and when ascertained.
It may not be inappropriate, however, to quote from an address of Mr. Justice F. Miller before the New York State Bar.
Association, where in discussing the subject of impeachment
he said :2
"It is not easy to suggest a better remedy. The tribunal would
be rendered more efficient and mre safe by a specific defintion of
the causes of removal. There are many matters which ought to
be causes of removal that are neither treason, bribery, nor high
crimes and misdemeanors. Physical infirmities for which a man is
not to blame, but which may wholly unfit him for judicial duty,
are of this class. Deafness, loss of sight, the decay of the faculties by reason of age, insanity, prostration by disease fromi which
there is no hope of recovery-these should all be reasons for removal, rather than that the administration of justice should be obstructed or indefinitely suspended.
"So, also, there are offences against the law, or conduct, which
might be made so, that peculiarly unfit the man for the office of
judge. A vile and overbearing temper becomes sometimes, in one
long accustomed to the exercise of power, unendurable to those
who are subiected to its humors. But I think the experience of
observers wil bear me out in saying, that habitual intoxication is
of all this class of disqualifications, the most frequent.
"Two things may be suggested as worthy of consideration in
any effort to amend the Constitution on this subject, namely:
That the causes for which a judge may be removed from office
shall be described with the same precision as that which is used in
defining indictable offences. Second, that whatever may be the
nature of the court before which he is tried, the fact of his guilt
of the impeachable offence, or disqualification charged, should be
found by a jury or similar tribunal. It is, however, to be remembered that a judge should, in the exercise of his functions, be
tramelled as little as possible by fear of consequences to himself,
and in view of the resentments of disappointed suitors the providing for removal should not be made too easy."
'2nd Annual Report, p. 40.
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And it may not be unimportant to note the practice in England.
It has been said :3
"In England the Lord Chancellor, or the Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, within their several jurisdictions, have power
to remove any county judge for either 'inability or misbehavior.'
No farce of an impeachment is required or allowed. A great and
perhaps somewhat arbitrary power is entrusted to a great functionary, upon the faith of its judicious exercise, under the corrective
influence of public opinion, and the system has not been found satisfactory."
It may well be thought that vesting so much power in one
man, and the summary method provided, are alike too undemocratic for our form of govermnent; but it would not be
difficult to draft an act defining "good behavior" and providing
for a trial by or under the control of the Supreme Court, by
which both of these objections would be obviated, and those
who had demonstrated their inability properly to perform the
duties of their offices could be removed therefrom though not
guilty of "treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors." "Good behavior" means good behavior in or as
affecting the office, and a course of conduct which brings the
office into disgrace or contempt is, therefore, a violation of the
good behavior tenure of the incumbent. An act such as suggested would, therefore, tend to render the judiciary independent of the other great departments of the government, would
answer the arguments of those who contend that the judges
should be more responsible to the public will, and would greatly
strengthen the judicial system generally.
Alex. Simpson, Jr.
Philadelphia.
'6 Solicitor's Journal and Reporter, 8o4-8o5.

